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Book Review 
Workers' Health and Safety: Whose Costs, 
Whose Benefits? 
By Joseph A. Page* 
CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY. By 
Nicholas A. Ashford. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1976. Pp. xii, 588. 
$16.95. 
Health and safety on the job remain sources of bitter controversy in the 
public forums. Businessmen rail against the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) for its "dictatorial" enforcement of "oppressive" 
regulations, 1 leading President Ford in early 1976 to demonstrate sympathy 
for their concems.2 Labor leaders deplore the failure of industry and govern-
ment to stem the toll of death and disablement from work-related disease. 3 
Members of' Congress, responsive to pressures from constituents, fill pages of 
the Congressional Record with reports of both employer vexations4 and 
employee tragedies. 5 
Like ships passing in the night, advocates on both sides tend to regard 
one another at a distance and seldom join issues in rational debate. Industry 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A. 1955, LL.B. 1958, LL.M. 
1964, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank Kathleen A. Blackburn, class of 1977, 
Georgetown University Law Center, for her assistance. 
1. For a representative sampling of complaints about OSHA, see Hearings on Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act Review Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor 
and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 (Oversight and Proposed Amendments) Before the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the 
House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as House 
Hearings]. 
2. See Burnham, Agency Assailed by Ford Defers New Safety Rules Till After Election, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1976, at 15, col. 1. In contrast, the Carter administration initially appears 
more attuned to labor's concerns for job safety. See [1976] OccUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 
(BNA) 947. 
3. See, e.g., Bishop, AFL-CIO Aide Charges Delay in Reports on Exposure to Cancer-
Causing Agents, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1976, at 6, col. 2. 
4. See, e.g., 122 CoNG. REc. S8670-71 (daily ed. June 8, 1976); id. at S5621-22 (daily ed. 
Apr. 13, 1976); id. at E2332 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1976). 
5. See, e.g., 122CONG. REC.E3226-27(dailyed.June9, 1976); id.atE1795(dailyed.Apr.2, 
1976); id. at E1710-11 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976). 
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harps on the bewildering multiplicity of OSHA standards, many of them 
trivial or vague. 6 Some authors have deemed the ne~ms between standards and 
safety dubious 7 and have further maintained that standards impose costs far in 
excess of any benefits they may bring.8 Small businesses feel at a particular 
disadvantage since they find it burdensome both to learn)Vhat the law requires 
of them and to fulfill their legal obligations. 9 Labor, on the other hand, prefers 
to ·stress the menace of occupational disease. The silent violence inflicted 
upon workers by toxic substances gives no sign of abating. Indeed, recent 
reports indicate that the current knowledge of health hazards on the job signals 
but the tip of a deadly iceberg. 10 Although Congress designed the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act of 197011 in large measure to protect employees from 
these very risks, 12 agency development of OSHA standards restricting 
exposures to harmful chemicals, dusts, and stresses has proceeded at an 
agonizingly slow pace. 13 
Instinctively, one would expect that efforts to save the lives of workers 
threatened by industrial disease would command a higher priority than 
measures to trim back excesses visited by OSHA upon employers in the name 
of safety regulation. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the case. 
Managerial irritation at OSHA, coupled with the general concern over the 
costs and inflationary impact of health and safety standards, has helped fuel a 
6. The industry position is aptly stated in testimony by Rep. Richard White in House 
Hearings, supra note 1, at 3-10, 17. 
7. See R. SMITH, THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT: ITS GOALS AND ITS 
ACHIEVEMENTS 59-71 (1976). . 
8. See M. WEIDENBAUM, GOVERNMENT-MANDATED PRICE INCREASES: A NEGLECTED As-
PECT OF INFLATION 43-55 (1975). 
9. See generally Hearings on Small Business and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Problems Affecting Small Business of the House 
Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); see also Jett, New Job-Safety Rules 
Perplex the Owners of Small Businesses; Needless Costs Cited, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1973, at 42, 
col. L 
10. For recent disclosures of job health hazards, see [1976] OccuPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 
(BNA) 884-85 (pesticide poisoning); Auerbach, Cancer Probed at Plant, Wash. Post, May 28, 
1976, at A-15, col. 1; Auerbach, Leukemia in Rubber Factories Probed, Wash. Post, May 1, 1976, 
atA-3, col. 2; Weinstein, A Battery Plant and Lead Poisoning, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1976,atF-1, 
col. 6. See generally J. STELLMAN & S. DAUM, WORK Is DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH (1973). 
1 L 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970). 
12. See id. §§ 651(b)(6)-(7). See also id. §§ 669,671. Foradiscussionofthebackgroundofthe 
Act, with references to the significance of occupational health concerns as catalysts for its 
passage, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, BITTER WAGES 47-189 (1973). 
13. See Page & Munsing, Occupational Health and the Federal Government: The Wages Are 
Still Bitter, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PRos. 651, 655-57 (1974). See also Hearings on Departments of 
Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1977 Before a Subcomm. of the 
House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at567-74, 581-83 (1976) (testimony 
of Morton Corn, Asst. Sec. of Labor for OSHA) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Appropriation 
Hearings]; HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, CHEMICAL DANGERS IN THE WORK-
PLACE, H.R. REP. No. 94-1688, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
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broad congressional backlash against federal regulation. 14 The reaction has 
spawned bills authorizing congressional power to veto agency rules15 and to 
initiate programs for regulatory reform. 16 Meanwhile, industry has been 
vigorously opposing OSHA health standards on the ground inter alia of 
economic infeasibility Y The reaction has placed labor very much on the 
defensive, struggling to preserve the Act against amendments that it perceives 
as crippling18 and to oppose an alleged overemphasis on costs in the 
standard-setting process. 19 Consequently, labor organizations have not been 
able to mount an all-out affirmative effort to reduce health hazards to workers. 
The time is therefore propitious for a fresh analysis of the core issues that 
give rise to the current disagreements over occupational health and safety. 
Crisis in the Workplace presents itself as such an endeavor. The fruits of a 
two-year study supported by the Ford Foundation, the book attempts to 
explore in a definitive, dispassionate manner the technical, legal, political, 
and economic aspects of safety and health regulation for the workplace. Its 
author, lawyer-economist Nicholas A. Ashford, sets his work apart from the 
horror story genre into which many prior books on the subject fall20-a 
worthy goal since a clear and pressing need exists for the development of 
policy and strategy options. 
Crisis offers an incredible wealth of detail in its survey of the dimensions 
of the problem and the various responses by the public and private sectors. It 
also catalogues an array of options for reform. The book's major weakness 
derives from the sin of overextension, which raises the suspicion that too 
much of the book is an attenuated rehash of previously published material. In 
addition, Dr. Ashford often fails to meet the challenge posed by the time lag 
inherent in the publication of a study of this size-that of maintaining 
relevance and utility in the face of subsequently unfolding events. Part of the 
book emerges as far superior to the rest: the materials on the economics of 
14. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. S2773-77 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1976); id. E869-74 (daily ed. Feb. 
26, 1976); id. E12-13 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1976). But see (1976) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 
(BNA) 885 (House subcommittee demands greater mine safety). 
15. E.g., H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See also H.R. REP. No. 1014, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess., pt. 1 (1976). On Sept. 21, 1976, the House passed H.R. 12048 by a 265-135 vote. 122 
CONG. REC. H10,718 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976). For a reference to OSHA as providing a major 
impetus for the bill, see Hearings on Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking Before 
the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 30, at 481 (1975). 
16. E.g., S. 3428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 2812, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
17. See Page & Munsing, supra note 13, at 663 & n.105; Rotman, Vinyl Chloride Costs on 
Safety Seen High, Wash. Post,June28, 1974,atA-26, col. 1;Wai1St.J., Aug. 7, 1975, at2, col. 3. 
18. See Sheehan, Let's Face It: Congress is Anti-OSHA, 4 INT'L UNION DEPT. OF THE 
AFL-CIO; SPOTL1GHTON HEALTH & SAFETY 1 (No.4, 1975). 
19. See, e.g., Richards, Steel Union Raps Coke Oven Rules, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1975, at 
C-1, col. 1. 
20. SeeDembart, HealthProblemsTracedtoJobs,N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1976,at23,col. 1. 
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occupational health and safety shed invaluable light upon the uses and abuses 
of cost-benefit analysis (pp. 308-423). They present insights into complex-
ities that current criticism of OSHA tends to ignore and, as a welcome bonus, 
offer discussion comprehensible to the noneconomist, a rare quality for 
interdisciplinary writing in law and economics. Indeed, one leaves this 
portion of the book with a thirst for more and a regret that the project did not 
confine itself to this jugular issue. The strengths and weaknesses of Crisis 
merit elaboration, first, by focusing on the book's treatment of the perform-
ance of the federal government concerning health and safety on the job and, 
second, by examining Ashford's contributions to the evaluation of costs. 
The 1970 Act gave the federal government for the first time a dominant 
role in the struggle against industrial accidents and diseases. 21 OSHA, within 
the Department of Labor, was assigned responsibility for the promulgation 
and enforcement of safety and health standards,22 the latter regulations 
evolving from recommendations of the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health (NIOSH). 23 Whenever an employer contests a citation 
issu.ed by OSHA while acting in its capacity as enforcer, the independent 
Occupational Safety and Heath Review Commission (OSHRC) adjudicates 
the case. 24 The United States courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review 
both OSHA standards25 and decisions of the OSHRC. 26 The Congress 
appropriates funds for the administration and enforcement of the Act, 
oversees the work of the various agencies involved, confirms the President's 
high-level appointments to OSHA and the Review Commission, and consid-
ers proposed amendments to the Act (pp. 141-50). Thus, an assessment ofthe 
Government's performance requires a hard look at the judicial, legislative, 
political, and administrative processes and their interaction. 
Crisis provides a summary of administrative and judicial interpretations 
of the Act during the first three years of its existence. The major disappoint-
ments in this section, apart from a lack of clarity on some minor matters, 27 
stem from a failure to pursue the implications of several significant points 
21. For a history of the federal role, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 167-90. 
22. 29 u.s.c. §§ 655, 658 (1970). 
23. Id. §§ 669(a)(2), 671. 
24. Id. §§ 659(c), 661. 
25. Id. § 655(f). 
26. Id. §§ 660(a)-(b). 
27. For example, in comparing the quantum of proof required for scientific conclusions with 
that deemed necessary for legal decisionmaking, Ashford makes the following dubious assertion: 
"When it comes to safe-guarding rights generally under the law, a 'scintilla of evidence' may 
justify legal sanctions, control, and even the establishment of liability" (pp. 41-42). Without 
attempting to explain the discrepancy, he records in successive paragraphs that the Act provides 
that existing federal standards come into effect automatically on the effective date of the law and 
that OSHA utilized a different section of the Act to promulgate these same existing federal 
standards some time later (p. 153). 
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raised and to lead the discussion of the developing case law beyond the 
horizontal digest level. For example, Ashford observes that employers have 
challenged the constitutionality of the Act, but does not delve past a mere 
recitation of the various grounds asserted (p. 167). The Supreme Court may 
soon decide whether the assessment of OSHA penalties without opportunity 
for a jury trial violates the Constitution, 28 and a ruling against the Government 
would seriously jeopardize the enforcement of the Act. Indeed, one federal 
district court has declared the OSHA inspection provision unconstitutional as 
a violation of fourth amendment limits on government searches. 29 The book 
contributes nothing to an understanding of the issues or of the potential 
significance of the case. 
Ashford suggests that the promulgation of health standards that do not 
provide special protection for pregnant women workers may violate Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act30 and the Constitution (p. 168). His anticipation of the 
potential legal problem is praiseworthy, particularly since recent disclosures 
have called attention to the special hazards that may endanger both working 
women and their future children.31 Despite his prognosis he does not go 
further to consider the very live problem of whether, in the abs~nce of an 
OSHA standard dealing with this particular risk, an employer may legally 
limit the work assigned to women generally or women of childbearing age, or 
even refuse to hire them. 32 
The legal material contributes little to the goals of the book. It remains 
too skimpy to serve as a mini-hornbook,33 and merely catalogues unresolved 
legal issues without any attempt at analysis (pp. 181-82). Crisis offers little 
28. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1200 
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458 (1976); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & 
Health Review Comm'n, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458 (1976). 
29. Barlow's, Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437 (D. Idaho 1976), stay granted sub nom. 
Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 776 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.). For other negative judicial 
reactions, both state and federal, see the list of cases in [19761 OCCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 
(BNA) 948-49. 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). 
31. See 1977 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 13, at 846 (testimony ofDavidJ. Sencer, 
Director, Center for Disease Control). See also [1975] 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 
980; Burham, Rise in Birth Defects Laid to Job Hazards, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1976, at 1,co1.2. 
Recently the Court has indicated a curious lack of logic in the definition of pregnancy as a 
sex-related phenomenon, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), which might weaken 
the chances of better occupational safety and health for pregnant women. See also Mathews v. 
De Castro, 97 S. Ct. 431 (1976). Instead of sex-related claims, advocates for protection of 
pregnant workers may find some relief through Department of Labor regulations allowing an 
employee a right to refuse work when he or she feels a dangerous working condition exists. 29 
C.F.R. § 1977 .12(b)(2) (1975). Federal district courts currently disagree over the validity of this 
right. See [1976] 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 852-53. 
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1972). See also Goodman, "Protecting" Women, Wash. Post, 
June 21, 1976, at A-23, col. 5. 
33. For a much more detailed treatment, see Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970: An Overview, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 477 (1974). 
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new insight on the institutional weaknesses of NIOSH, which has never 
emerged from the interstices of the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare. 34 Ashford raises the point that, while NIOSH technicians conduct 
workplace inspections to evaluate hazards, tliey have no authority to issue 
citations for any violations they may find (p. 279). A lamentable need 
continues for an investigation into the extent to which NIOSH personnel 
inform OSHA of the existence of these hazards and the extent of action by 
OSHA inspectors on the basis of those reports. Unfortunately, the Ford 
Foundation study did not undertake the task. 
The book's analysis of OSHA is disappointing because it conveys no 
sense of the difficulties the Agency has encountered in developing standards 
through the informal rulemaking procedure mandated by the Act35 and refined 
by judicial review. 36 OSHA promulgated final standards limiting the expo-
sure of employees to asbestos dust, vinyl chloride, and certain other carcino-
gens well before the completion of the manuscript of the book;37 thus it should 
have been apparent that the rulemaking process followed by the Agency had 
become incredibly cumbersome, fraught with complexity, and vulnerable to 
delay tactics by the parties. 38 The necessity for streamlining procedures has 
not diminished in light of recent OSHA efforts to promulgate rules for noise39 
and coke oven ernissions.40 Legal issues, such as whether OSHA may 
exercise subpoena power provided for in section 657(b) of the Ac~1 to gather 
data needed for the development of standards,42 lurk beneath the surface. 
Crisis, however, makes no contribution to a resolution of these difficulties 
34. For a discussion of the history of NIOSH (formerly known as either Bureau of 
Occupational Safety and Health or BOSH) and its problems, see J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra 
note 12, at 88-94; Page & Munsing, supra note 13, at 654-57. 
35. 29 u.s.c. § 655 (1970). 
36. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Associated Indus., Inc. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1973). See also Note, 
Judicial Review Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act: The Substantial Evidence Test as 
Applied to Informal Rulemaking, 1974 DuKE L.J. 459 (1974). 
37. See 39 Fed. Reg. 3756 (1974) (carcinogens); 39 Fed. Reg. 35,890 (1974) (vinyl chloride); 
37 Fed. Reg. 11,318 (1972) (asbestos dust). 
38. OSHA has adopted a 22-step process, beginning with the development of a proposed 
standard, followed by various internal reviews, five internal revisions, Federal Register publica-
tion of the proposed standard, two more reviews and revisions, and culminating in Federal 
Register publication of the final standard. For a summary of the process, see Hearings on 
Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations for 1976 Before a 
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., I st Sess., pt. 5, at 625-26 (1975). 
For an account of the asbestos proceedings, seeP. BRODEUR, EXPENDABLE AMERICANS (1974). 
For an account of the carcinogen proceedings, see Page & Munsing, supra note 13, at 657-65. 
39. See 40 C.F.R. § 203 (1976) (occupational noise exposure). See also Mossberg, Hearings 
on Tough Job-Noise Ceilings Start Today, and an Uproar Is Certain, Wall St. J.,June23, 1975, at 
26, col. I. 
40. See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,784 (1976) (coke oven emissions). 
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (1970). 
42. See note 29 supra. 
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beyond a factual and somewhat critical description of the rulemaking proce-
dure used to set carcinogen standards (pp. 154-59). 
Further, the book fails to discuss adequately industry's objections to the 
plethora of job safety rules. This drumfire of criticism falls upon the number 
and complexity of safety standards,43 most of which were promulgated 
without hearings in accord with section 655 of the Act, 44 and upon the 
allegedly arbitrary enforcement of these rules by OSHA inspectors. 45 Al-
though Ashford recognizes these problems, he does not address them in a 
format that would contribute to the resolution of the continuing brouhaha. He 
criticizes OSHA's compliance program, but suggests no more than increased 
dedication and perseverance (pp. 253-60, 298-99). 
The clean bill of health Ashford gives to the three-member OSHRCU' has 
proved a faulty diagnosis. The removal of the OSHRC's first chairman under 
cloudy circumstances47 and the subsequent filing of a suit by the ex-chairman 
against his two colleagues48 suggest that the Commission is not functioning 
well. This suspicion derives further support from the acrimonious relation-
ships among the commissioners,49 the continuing uncertainties about the 
structure and role of the Commission, 50 and the staggering backlog of pending 
43. See note 6 supra; e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm 'n, 542 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1976) (corporation unsuccessful in appealing scaffolding standards 
as vague). 
44. 29 u.s.c. § 655(b)(3) (1970). 
45. See note 1 supra. 
46. ''On balance, the Commission maintains the degree of competence one would expect on 
the basis of its high GS level" (p. 302). 
47. See [1975) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 347. Former OSHRC Chairman 
Robert D. Moran claimed that he was removed from the chairmanship because he had com-
plained to the White House about Labor Department involvement in the nomination of OSHRC 
commissioners. See 5 OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY LETTER 1 (Dec. 8, 1975). He has also 
asserted that his policy of issuing press releases about cases that OSHA had lost before the 
Commission angered the Labor Department and contributed to his dismissal as Chairman. See 
Pike, Press Releases on Failures Helped Demote Chief of Health Unit, Wash. Star, Nov. 27, 1975, 
at A-ll, col. I. 
48. Moran v. Barnako, No. 75-1981 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 25, 1975). The suit alleged that the 
other two commissioners were disposing of cases without notice to Moran. It was dismissed 
when all three commissioners adopted a statement clarifying the Commission's decisional 
procedures. See [1975) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1019. 
49. For example, Chairman Moran's publication of proposed Freedom of Information Act 
regulations over the objections of his two colleagues drew a stinging comment from Commis-
sioner Timothy F. Cleary. See [1975) 0CCUPA. SAFETY & HEALTH REP. (BNA) 1040-41. The 
attitudes of the commissioners occasionally surface in their opinions. See, e.g., D. Federico Co., 
3 O.S.H.C. (BNA) 1970,1975 (OSHRC 1976)(Moran, C., dissenting): "Thelogicofthemajority 
is such that if someone refers to a dog's tail as a leg, that particular dog would thereafter have five 
legs. Come to think of it, a five-legged dog makes more sense than the Barnako-Oeary logic used 
throughout the foregoing opinion." See also Francisco Tower Serv., Inc., 3 O.S.H.C. (BNA) 
1952, 1961 (OSHRC 1976) (Moran, C., dissenting): "This kind of 'logic' could equally be used to 
prove that Messrs. Barnako and Oeary are really justices of the United States Supreme Court or 
members of the Holy Trinity." 
50. For example, is the Commission a "court" exercising solely adjudicative functions or 
does it also have the characteristics of an agency? See Moran, A Court in the Executive Branch of 
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cases.51 Although the OSHRC would benefit greatly from close scrutiny, 
Crisis sheds no light on its problems. 
Ashford recognizes the existence and importance of the political impact 
of job-related health and safety regulation, but he approaches this delicate 
area like a conscript entering a mine field. He includes at the beginning of the 
Appendix the infamous Guenther memorandum, written in 1972 by the then 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health to describe 
how OSHA might help in the campaign to reelect Richard Nixon by not 
proposing any highly controversial standards and by exploiting "the great 
potential of OSHA as a sales point for fund raising and general support by 
employers" (pp. 543-44). Ashford merely deplores the memo as "a sad 
commentary on the lack of government responsibility'' (p. 538) and treads no 
further. The New York Times has reported that, at a time when in his 
reelection campaign President Ford was criticizing OSHA for being too tough 
on industry, OSHA postponed until after the 1976 elections the promulgation 
of a number of important health standards. 52 Thus, the problem symbolized 
by the Guenther memorandum has not disappeared and deserves careful 
attention. 
Congressional oversight provides a countervailing force that could offset 
the political machinations of the executive branch. As with his executive 
analysis, Ashford backs off and refuses to analyze the forces that interact on 
Capitol Hill. Crisis offers no insights into the committees that control the 
legislation concerning safety and health in the workplace, confirmations, and 
appropriations, nor does it critique the performance of Congress since the 
effective date of the Act. 53 
Although Ashford's review of the performance of the public sector 
falters at points, he redeems these shortcomings in his delineation of the limits 
of applying economic analysis to governmental efforts to protect workers 
from injury and disease. A weighing of costs and benefits is appropriate at 
Government: The Strange Case of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 20 
WAYNE L. REv. 999 (1974). See also Moran, Discretionary Review by the Occupational Safety 
and Health Review Commission: Is it Necessary?, 46 CoLO. L. REv. 139 (1974) (Should the 
current system, whereby OSHRC commissioners have discretion to call cases for review, be 
replaced by a system limiting OSHRC review to cases in which affected parties petition 
OSHRC?). 
51. At the end of fiscal year 1975, there were 466 cases pending for review by the full 
Commission. After the first six months of fiscal year 1976, that figure had increased to 621. See 
1977 Appropriation Hearings, supra note 13, at 1347. 
52. See Burnham, supra note 2. 
53. For criticisms of aspects of congressional performance, see Burnham, Senator Criticizes 
Job Safety Agency, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1974, at 37, col. I (report of discrepancy between 
charges of OSHA harassment made by Sen. Peter H. Dominick, minority member of the Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, and version of story told by businessman supposedly 
harassed); J. PAGE & M. O'BRIEN, supra note 12, at 193 (criticism of Senate Labor and Public 
Welfare Committee hearing on nomination of OSHRC commissioners). 
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four points in the decisionmaking process: (1) the threshold determination of 
whether any need for governmental intervention exists; (2) the delineation of 
the general strategy any needed intervention should assume; (3) case-by-case 
decision, in which governmental intervention takes such forms as the setting 
and enforcing of mandatory standards; and (4) subsequent evaluations of the 
effectiveness of governmental intervention. Ashford makes a major contribu-
tion by demonstrating that a cost-benefit approach in and of itself offers no 
easy answers at any point in the process. 
Governmental intervention through the workmen's compensation laws 
and health and safety codes derives from the realization that "placing sole 
reliance upon the unregulated free market leads to a socially unacceptable 
level of workplace injury, illness, and death" (p. 311). Without intervention, 
employers would not bear the costs of preventing or compensating for harms 
caused by industrial accidents and diseases and therefore would permit the 
financial burden to fall upon employees and the public. Economically, it is in 
society's best interest to minimize the sum total of these costs. 54 Therefore, 
within the framework of a free-enterprise system, government should intrude, 
but only to the extent necessary to create economic incentives that will induce 
industry to take measures to achieve the goal of cost minimization. Cost-
benefit analysis furnishes a tool for calculating the appropriate degree of 
governmental intervention; the analysis has become very important to the 
1970 Act, which the courts have interpreted to require consideration of costs 
and benefits in the creation of health ~d safety standards. 55 
Ashford launches a double-barreled attack on cost-benefit analysis as it 
has been applied to occupational health and safety regulation. He points out 
numerous market imperfections, including the interplay of nonmarket fac-
tors, that make it exceedingly difficult-if not impossible--to decide the 
necessary level of governmental intervention on a cost-benefit basis. He then 
raises the critical query whether the socially acceptable level of work hazards 
should derive solely from economic considerations. 
The list of market imperfections begins with the inadequacy of the data 
base, an insurmountable obstacle to intelligent choice (pp. 335-38). A further 
flaw is the inadequate dissemination given to available data (pp. 335-37). 
These shortcomings become particularly acute in the area of occupational 
health and can lead to an underestimation of the benefits of prevention as well 
54. See G. CALABRESI, THE Cosrs OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970): "Apart from the requirements of 
justice, I take it as axiomatic that the principal function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the 
costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents." 
55. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). See also Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 130(5th Cir. 
1974). 
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as an overestimation of the costs of avoidance. Information obtained after the 
introduction of a new manufacturing process or substance into the workplace 
may be useless for regulatory purposes because of the constant innovation 
characteristic of modem industry. The information gap is widened by a 
divergence in time horizons, as a result of which initiatives for the prevention 
of disease must begin long before its possible manifestation. Another diver-
gence weakening the operation of market forces occurs when top manage-
ment sets long-range corporate goals of accident and illness reduction, but 
evaluates lower and middle management for promotion purposes on the 
short-run basis of reduction in costs. These short-run cost reductions rarely 
reflect consideration of the costs of preventing future job-related diseases. 
Both the goal of reducing costs imposed by work hazards and the 
collateral goal of minimizing the costs of prevention seek to avoid injuries and 
illnesses worth avoiding and to permit the incurrence of those not worth 
avoiding. As a necessary corollary to these goals, workers must be free to 
judge the personal worth of the risk that society has deemed economically not 
worth avoiding. Ashford argues that, in reality, workers do not have this 
choice and points to a decrease in interfirm mobility and the psychic stresses 
associated with loss of employment as chains that bind workers to hazardous 
jobs. Nonmarket factors also nullify an employee's freedom to assume or 
reject occupational risks. These include the social conditioning of workers to 
accept job hazards and the irreversibility of certain diseases, which an 
employee may have contracted long before he learns of his plight. ''A worker 
can therefote come to have serious cause to regret an earlier decision 
regarding the assumption of workplace risk, but at that point it may be too late 
to move to a safe job" (p. 356). 
Industry and government must take market imperfections into account to 
obtain an accurate indication of the economic burdens that occupational 
health and safety standards may justifiably impose. The imperfections render 
unintelligible even an approximation of the costs and benefits of regulation by 
government of workplace hazards. Ashford carries the problem one step 
further by questioning the propriety of making such decisions in economic 
terms alone. He asks us to consider who pays the costs and who reaps the 
benefits (p. 330). Although the public may profit from toleration of a certain 
level of work hazards, the actual burden of bearing them falls upon a specific 
group of employees who may not have understood the health risk when they 
began work and who may not have the ability to change jobs once they 
discover the risk and desire to avoid it. The selection of workers to endure 
workplace pollution is nonrandom, Ashford argues (pp. 85-88). They do not 
comprise a representative sample of the general public, but instead remain 
concentrated in certain particularly hazardous occupations. Therefore, it is 
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inequitable to ask them to bear the entire risk so that the entire population may 
enjoy the fruits of modem technology, even though a cost-benefit analysis 
may conclude that the risk is economically justifiable. How much weight to 
accord the "justice factor" (pp. 359-63) may vary according to the values of 
the person making the judgment. Ashford makes the important point that 
society ought to pay heed to this consideration in deciding how much 
occupational health and safety regulation government should impose. 
Implicit in Ashford's underscoring the limitations of cost-benefit 
analysis is the dilemma OSHA must confront whenever it sets standards. The 
agency must consider the economic feasibility of a proposed standard, a 
requirement recognized by the courts.56 Moreover, the requirement has 
become more onerous as a result of a recent executive order mandating the 
preparation of inflation impact statements by executive agencies that under-
take major regulatory activities. 57 Because accurate measurement of costs and 
benefits must reflect market imperfections, the complexity may so confound 
the rule making process that it becomes unworkable. OSHA may not have the 
resources to gather and analyze the necessary data; 58 thus occasions for delay 
in the promulgation of final standards may multiply. At the same time, the 
substantial and constantly increasing number of toxic substances in the 
workplace imposes burgeoning pressures on OSHA to increase its pace of 
setting standards. In the midst of these travails, the agency has received 
virtually no help from Congress, which has never expended the time or effort 
to consider carefully the economic element in occupational health and safety 
regulation. 
Crisis in the Workplace does not offer any solutions, but by pointing out 
the extent of the problem in terms of economic goals and methods, it performs 
a service of inestimable value. The shortcomings of the book stem in large 
part from the high standards against which an opus of this magnitude deserves 
to be measured. Its merits should attract close scrutiny on the part of 
individuals and groups in the private and public sectors concerned with 
reducing the toll of work-related accidents and diseases. 
56. See cases cited note 55 supra. 
57. Exec. Order No. 11,821, 3A C.F.R. 203 (Supp. 1974). A labor union has challenged the 
legality of this order as applied to OSHA. Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Usery, 
Civ. No. 76,365 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 3, 1976). 
58. The academic backgrounds of the 33-person staff of OSHA's Division of Health 
Standards Development revealed a solitary degree (B.A.) in economics. See 1977 Appropriation 
Hearings, supra note 13, at 568-69 (1976). 
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